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In order to make a modest contribution to legal scholarship, one can
either write definitively on a subject of limited importance or sketchily on a
subject of arguably greater importance. This Article falls easily within the
latter category. Its subject is nothing less than the judicial system's potential
for response to perceived or actual manifestations of broad long-term socie-
tal decline. The Article discusses theories of societal decadence in general
terms, and then considers examples involving judicial responses to obscene
and offensive speech, criminal behavior, and the rights of undocumented
aliens.
For the sake of this Article's manageability, certain issues are avoided
or treated as uncontroversially as possible. The Article, for example, re-
mains as neutral as possible on rival conceptions of what societal decline
involves or is caused by. It also takes no position on whether our own society
can be fairly described as being at some stage in the course of overall long
term decline, however one could conceive such a state of affairs. This is for
several reasons. First, even once a common conception of societal decline or
its more lurid, heavily freighted synonym "decadence" is arrived at, the
problem of persuading an audience that the concept is applicable to a given
society is substantial. One does not convince a skeptic of the decadence of a
society by the conventional means of advancing masses of evidence of which
the skeptic is not aware. One's view of matters such as broad decadence or
vitality is not reinforced or undermined in the same way one changes one's
mind about a narrow experimental hypothesis, or the probable guilt of a
particular criminal defendant. It is more a matter of changing the way one
looks at familiar things.
Equally important, pronouncing one's own society decadent--espe-
cially in the early, less unequivocal stages of decline-requires having better
perspective than those within that society. Societal decline in the senses ex-
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plored by this Article is a long term phenomenon,' an uneven process of
apparent revival and recovery phases alternating with ultimately more tell-
ing periods of deterioration.2 Knowing our own society's location in the
process is thus rather a tall order.3 Of course, this immediately suggests one
reason why even courts that feel themselves bound to uphold and maintain
values enunciated or adopted two centuries before4 rarely feel themselves in
a position to identify long-term societal decline, or to contribute to any of
the wide variety of possible responses to such decline. No judge, at any
point, can reasonably feel certain that she is in fact confronted with any such
phenomenon of genuine decline in the context of any pending judicial case.
This Article cannot avoid controversy entirely. Some may argue that
the concept of long-term societal decline or, even worse, the concept of deca-
dence lacks any useful, unequivocal substance. It is fair to say that one en-
counters vagueness and ambiguity of reference when surveying these
concepts' use.5 It is probably an overstatement, though, to suggest that the
concept of decadence, even when used with rigor and caution, is unavoidably
little more than an arbitrarily applied pejorative label, virtually empty of
content.6 The same charges could be leveled at other concepts that we do
not propose to dispense with, such as the concept of political freedom. 7
While the concept of decadence has frequently been used inadvisedly,
the concept itself seems redeemable and potentially useful. 8 Decadence can
be a name, or a sensible evaluation, of phenomena that seem quite real. Use
of the term is supported by analogy and by common sense. It has been said,
for example, that "[t]hinking of a family as maintaining a continuous exist-
ence over time, one can hardly help distinguishing the good stages of energy
and prosperity from the bad ones of poverty and decay-to which, without
undue strain, the adjective 'decadent' may get attached."9 Similarly, "[w]hat
is true of families may be equally true of cities and states; after a period of
prosperity, without succumbing to any obvious force majeure, they may de-
cline into weakness and ineffectuality."' 0
Without adopting such an analysis in all its particulars as crisply defini-
tive of decadence, the family analogy seems recognizable and generally
meaningful. It is also possible to validate the concept of decadence indi-
rectly, through the recognizability of its opposite.I A given society may be
1. See R. ADAMS, DECADENT SOCIETIES 13 (1983); White, On Properties and Decadence in
Society, 87 ETHICS 352, 359 (1977).
2. See A. TOYNBEE, CIVILIZATION ON TRIAL 13 (1948).
3. See R. ADAMS, supra note 1, at 13.
4. See, eg., Judge Bork's opinion in Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993, 995-96 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
5. See C. JOAD, DECADENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 55 (1948); Molnar, On Decadence
and Decline, 21 MODERN AGE 395, 397 (1977); Winthrop, Variety of Meaning in the Concept of
Decadence, 31 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 510, 510 (1971).
6. For a claim along these lines, see R. GILMAN, DECADENCE: THE STRANGE LIFE OF AN
EPITHET 14, 16, 21, 40, 153-54, 160, 162 (1979).
7. See, eg., I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969);
Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 167 (1956).
8. See R. ADAMS, supra note 1, at 2.
9. Id. at 2-3.
10. Id. at 4.
11. See C. JOAD, supra note 5, at 56.
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characterized as vigorous, or vital; robust, fertile, healthy, exuberant. If the
latter judgments are not completely arbitrary, and they seem not to be,
neither need be their opposites, for which we might reserve the term
'decadent.'
Before surveying some of the most plausible, mainstream accounts of
what decadence involves, certain preliminary points should be clarified.
First, the concept of decadence, if it is otherwise coherent, can be applied to
societies as a whole, and not merely to institutions such as the arts. 12 Simi-
larly, the concept need not be applied exclusively to matters of personal or
social morality. 13 This is so despite the fact that the concept of decadence
undeniably has pejorative connotations. 14
Despite the concept's negative connotations, it cannot be assumed that
a decadent society is one without value or without accomplishments. An
immoral society may be barbaric, rather than decadent-a cartoonlike image
of the ancient Vikings may serve as an illustration' 5-and a decadent society
may be preferable to live in, or at least less disagreeable than a non-decadent
society bent on conquest at great sacrifice. 16 More specifically, a declining
society may be more "open" generally, and there is no reason to rule out the
possibility of at least certain kinds of intellectual progress in a society in
general decline, at least in its initial stages. It has been suggested, for exam-
ple, that a high degree of scientific achievement may be compatible with
overall cultural decline. 17
This Article also takes no position on the issues of the alleged inevitabil-
ity of societal decline or the aptness of biological analogies in reflecting upon
societal decline. Some writers are less than sanguine about the prospects for
the regeneration of a decadent society; i8 others see no reason to assume the
irreversibility of general decline. 19 It is also possible to reject a crude biolog-
ical or life-cycle analogy, in which societies are initially "young," become"mature," and eventually "die," while not resolving the issue of the alleged
12. See Winthrop, supra note 5, at 510.
13. See White, supra note 1, at 356-57.
14. See Winthrop, supra note 5, at 510.
15. See White, supra note 1, at 357-58.
16. See C. JOAD, supra note 5, at 71; White, supra note 1, at 358. Professor White goes on to
contend that not all decadent societies are inert or passive. Id.
17. See Dawson, Progress and Decay in Ancient and Modern Civilization, 16 Soc. REv. 1, 6
(1924). Richard Gilman maintains that every decline is also and simultaneously a rise and an ad-
vance, every waning a renewal. See R. GILMAN, supra note 6, at 162. This may be so in some loose
sense, but the rise of an illiterate invading tribe may seem not to fully compensate for the overall
eclipse of a once flourishing society now indifferent to its self-defense or to its own august cultural
traditions, at least from the standpoint of the society invaded, even if overall decline at last brings
wisdom. Cf. G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 13 (T.M. Knox trans. 1967) ("The owl of Minerva
spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk."), suggesting that only when a society has "grown
old" and fallen into decline does philosophy reach its culmination of insight.
18. See, eg., 0. SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST 30-31 (A. Helps ed. 1965); Campbell,
Oswald Spengler: The Approaching Death of Western Civilization, 8 FUTURES 438, 443 (1976).
David Hume was able to conclude that "when the arts and sciences come to perfection in any state,
from that moment they naturally, or rather necessarily, decline and seldom or never revive in that
nation where they formerly flourished." D. HUME'S POLITICAL ESSAYS 120 (C. Hendel ed. 1953).
19. See, eg., R. ADAMS, supra note 1, at 8; W. DURANT & A. DURANT, THE LESSONS OF
HISTORY 91-92 (1968); R. GILMAN, supra note 6, at 67, 162; Dawson, supra note 17, at 11; White,
supra note 1, at 359.
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inevitability of decline.20 Of course, it would be surprising if most judges
assumed the inevitability of decline of their own society, at least in the
harshly fatalistic sense that they saw no way collectively to even modestly
contribute to any sort of rational response by the society to its own perceived
decline. If this is for no other reason, it is because judges take an oath to
protect and preserve constitutionally established values.
While it may be true that most writers normatively using the concept of
decadence "do so conservatively, advocating explicitly or implicitly a return
to norms which are rapidly disappearing from the cultures in which they
find themselves, ' 21 this is of course not our focus. This Article aims simply
at a description and explanation of the general judicial non-responsiveness to
long-term societal decline, despite the judicial commitment to values and
standards adopted centuries earlier. One explanation, suggested above, is
that even among judges of appropriate temperament and training, taking
account of perceived long-term societal decline hardly seems appropriate in
any particular case. Considerations of alleged broad long-term societal de-
cline stretch even the expansive category of "legislative facts"22 or "policy"
considerations.
More crucially, though, the whole enterprise of precedent-based com-
mon law judging is by its nature inhospitable to a judge's considering a phe-
nomenon like long-term societal decline. The primary judicial focus must in
each litigated case be on the marginal difference between the case at bar and
one or more arguably similar prior cases.23 Societal decline we have taken to
be a gradual, uneven, long-term phenomenon. The presumably relevant
prior cases cannot be supposed to have introduced considerations of deca-
dence into their reasoning. The case now at bar is presumably only margin-
ally different in its facts from one or more of those prior cases. Because our
society is by assumption only slightly different from the way it was at the
time of the earlier cases, i.e., only slightly more decadent, the common law
decisionmaking process leaves judges with no natural or obviously legitimate
point at which to first introduce, let alone make controlling, any considera-
tions of long-term societal decline.
To illustrate this, an analogy can be drawn to grains of sand and a heap
of sand. Judges might agree that if one is confronted with a heap of sand, or
with long-term societal decline, one may legitimately take that into account,
all else equal. But a few isolated phenomena do not constitute overall long-
term societal decline, just as two or three grains of sand do not constitute a
heap of sand. The problem, of course, is that if N grains of sand are not a
heap, neither are N+ 1 grains. And if what has developed up to a particular
20. Pitrim Sorokin rejected the uniform applicability of the life-cycle analogy to societies, while
still believing that our current "sensate" cultural phase must inevitably exhaust its possibilities. See
P. SOROKiN, THE CRISIS OF OUR AGE 23-24, 28 (1941).
21. Winthrop, supra note 5, at 526.
22. See generally Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942) (defining legislative facts); Davis, "There Is A Book Out. . . ": An
Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1987) (analyzing judi-
cial decisions influenced by legislative facts); Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Leg-
islative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111 (1988).
23. See generally E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949).
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time has not been thought substantial enough to be judicially cognizable as
long-term societal decline, neither, presumably, will what has happened up
to that point, along with the most recent events, particularly given the grad-
ualness and equivocality of historical trends.
SOME ATTEMPTS AT DEFINING LONG-TERM SOCIETAL DECLINE
Some portion of the explanation for judicial non-responsiveness to long-
term societal decline may also be laid at the door of the contrasts, if not
inconsistencies, among different theories of what the courts should look for
when they are looking for decadence. At a minimum, one might commend
judicial attention to indicators such as an overall long term decline in eco-
nomic growth rates,24 international competitiveness, or in ranking among
developed nations in economic product per capita, as well as savings rates
versus current consumption and collective educational achievement. How-
ever difficult it is to measure and compare, for example, savings rates across
time and cultures, such an inquiry is at least less purely judgmental than
other less quantitative indicia of decline.
Less narrowly quantitative approaches to long-term societal decline do
command support, however, in part because they seem richer and more fully
descriptive. Professor Joad, for example, provisionally defines decadence for
his purposes as "the valuing of experience for its own sake, irrespective of
the quality of the experience, the object of the experience, that upon which
the experience is, as it were, directed being left out of account."' 25 Thus, in a
decadent era, "[t]he success of our lives will... be judged not by the degree
to which they realize an end, achieve a goal, fulfil a purpose or conform to a
standard which we have recognized as authoritative, but by the extent to
which they contrive to embody a series of significant experiences."' 26 Profes-
sor Joad therefore maintains that decadence tends to be associated with
"(1) Scepticism in belief; (2) Epicurianism and Hedonism in conduct;
(3) Subjectivism in thought, art and morals." 27
Somewhat differently, Pitrim Sorokin cited four elements as sympto-
matic of the decline of any socio-cultural system. These elements include
heightened irreconcilable self-contradictions within the society,28 formless-
ness, "a progressive exhaustion of its creativeness in the field of great and
perennial values," and what Sorokin refers to as "quantitative colossalism,"
24. See generally M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982); Brittan, How Brit-
ish Is the British Sickness, 21 J.L. & ECON. 245 (1978).
25. C. JOAD, supra note 5, at 54.
26. Id. at 101.
27. Id. at 100. One might of course compare Joad's emphasis on the "preoccupation with the
self and its experiences" in decadent societies, id. at 117, with C. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCIs-
SISM (1979).
28. P. SOROKIN, supra note 20, at 241. Cf. D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF
CAPITALISM 7, 248-49 (1976) (noting "the end of the bourgeois idea" in an era of resistance to curbs
on acquisitiveness, increased popular demands for government "entitlements," and an individualist
ethos in tension with necessary social responsibilities and social sacrifices). See also J. LINZ, THE
BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: CRISIS, BREAKDOWN, & REEQUILIBRATION 52-53
(1978) (elaborating Linz's conception of "unsolvable" problems, in the form of goals that the govern-
ment can neither renounce nor attain).
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defined as "mere size and quantity at the cost of quality."'29 Sorokin was of
the view that our "sensate" culture, more subjectively, "appears to have lost
its self-confidence." '30
Relatedly, decadence has been associated with a lack of "an animating
vision of an ideal state of affairs" 31 and with major social institutions taking
on a merely instrumental value, leading to a sense of the social system as"meaningless, directionless, and self-destructive." 32 A bit more formally, it
has been suggested that "'decadence' may be used as shorthand for the con-
dition of a society incapable of transcending difficulties that, years before, it
would have shrugged off as routine."' 33 Another similarly formal approach
emphasizes the decadent society's arrival, after a long-term gradual change
"for the worse," at a condition in which the society persists in a tendency "to
lack all strong commitment to anything other than the worthless or near
worthless."' 34 Of course, the decadent society itself will predictably be impa-
tient with such an approach, arguing in response that it fails to recognize, in
an appropriately relativistic, subjectivist manner, that what is worthless, or
vacuous, or trivial to one person may not be so to another. Other typical, if
less essential or invariant, qualities of a decadent society may include "an
unwillingness to fight for survival, a lack of self-discipline and social cohe-
sion, [and] a very high tolerance of incompatible standards and codes of
behavior."35
RECURRING THEMES IN THE LITERATURE ON
LONG-TERM SOCIETAL DECLINE
Several phenomena are frequently cited as indicators, if not actual
causes, of long-term societal decline. These phenomena range from the pro-
saic and relatively narrow in scope to the lurid and expansive. Among the
former, one may find such elements as loss of foreign markets, excessive
taxation, excessive concentration in the distribution of wealth, and concen-
tration of poverty in the great cities. 36 Among the widely cited broader con-
comitants of long-term societal decline is what might be called an
impairment of elite functioning.37 It is of course possible to argue that any
such perspective is "elitist" in a normatively bad sense, or that the whole
conception is irrelevant in modem societies that subscribe at least nominally
to equality of opportunity and status among citizens. Nevertheless, the pos-
29. P. SOROKIN, supra note 20, at 241.
30. Id. at 252.
31. L. HAWORTH, DECADENCE AND OBJECTIVITY 3 (1977).
32. Id. at 4-6.
33. R. ADAMS, supra note 1, at 5. Arguably of at least equal importance is the condition in
which a society cannot solve a persisting, systematic problem which, though unsolvable also in an
earlier day, would not have been generated or allowed to develop in an earlier, non-decadent society.
34. White, supra note I, at 355-56. "Worthless" here is meant to include not only the affirma-
tively evil, but the merely vacuous or trivial as well, and White's definition should not imply that the
decadent society is strongly committed to anything at all, including the worthless.
35. Id. at 354. Remarkably high tolerance levels for all sorts of behavior is of course another
respect in which a decadent society may seem admirable and healthy.
36. W. Durant & A. Durant, supra note 19, at 92.
37. See, e.g., id.; A. TOYNBEE, supra note 2, at 13; Molnar, supra note 5, at 401-02.
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sibility of a decline in elite functioning remains of contemporary concern,38
and is often thought to lead to undesirable consequences, such as a combina-
tion of both oppressiveness and underenforcement of the law,39 a public
policy orientation toward short-term considerations, 40 and a rise in subjec-tivism, 4 1 hedonism, and irreverence for its own sake.4 2 The loss of a sense
of social hierarchy has even been blamed for an increase in a vague, unar-
ticulated sense of ultimate meaninglessness. 43
While there is no doubt reactionary excess to some of the rhetoric asso-
ciated with these themes, to some extent each of the elements noted above
can be plausibly associated with a process of overall long-term societal de-
cline. The themes of increasing subjectivism, moral relativism, and skepti-
cism are often taken to be closely associated with societal decay,4 4 and it is
thought that their prevalence within a society can change over time.45 De-
spite the undeniable natural law influences on the framers of our Constitu-
tion,46 there has been, at least in the twentieth century, a significant strain of
ethical skepticism, relativism, and subjectivism within American
jurisprudence.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is perhaps the clearest distinguished
example in this regard. Holmes, who referred to morality as "a sort of
higher politeness," 47 wrote to Harold Laski:
I often think of the way our side shrieked during the late war at
various things done by the Germans such as the use of gas. We said
gentlemen don't do such things-to which the Germans: "Who the
hell are you? We do them." There was no superior tribunal to de-
cide-so logically the Germans stood as we did.4 8
38. See, eg., A. SOLZHENrrSYN, A WORLD SPLIT APART 9-11 (1978) (detecting a decline in"courage" among Western political elites, despite occasional boldness in dealing with weaker gov-
ernments); Molnar, supra note 5, at 405 (increasing elite or governmental disinclination to resist
public opinion); E.D. HIRSCH, CULTURAL LrrERACY 4-9 (1987) (noting declining educational
achievement of the most talented students); A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 22
(1987) (noting that his strictures are based essentially on observation of an academic elite).
39. See Molnar, supra note 5, at 398.
40. See Buchanan, The Samaritan's Dilemma, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC
THEORY 84 n.6 (E.S. Phelps ed. 1975). See also P. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF GREAT
POWERS 527 (1987), for a discussion of long term costs of public indebtedness.
41. See Molnar, supra note 5, at 402.
42. See id. at 401. It is not difficult to imagine how such processes could be self-exacerbating
over time. As less is revered, presumably irreverence must over a long period of time become more
extreme or more pervasive to produce much psychological effect.
43. See Dawson, supra note 17, at 8.
44. See C. JOAD, supra note 5, at 111:
in regard to morals, one man's judgement about right or wrong is taken to be as good as
another's, precisely because no object' is postulated in the shape of a moral order which,
existing independently of ourselves and rooted in the nature of things, can serve as a stan-
dard by reference to which one mode of behavior can be judged morally superior to an-
other...
See also Molnar, supra note 5, at 402-03; White, supra note 1, at 361 (viewing increasing subjectivism
as perhaps a consequence, rather than a cause, of decadence).
45. Alexander Solzhenitsyn observes that "[t]wo hundred or even fifty years ago, it would have
seemed quite impossible, in America, that an individual be granted boundless freedom with no pur-
pose, simply for the satisfaction of his whims." A. SOLZHENITSYN, supra note 38, at 51.
46. See, eg., J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1965).
47. 2 HOLMES-LASKI LErFERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAR-
OLD J. LASKI 837 (M. DeWolfe Howe ed. 1953) (letter to Laski of May 13, 1926).
48. Id. at 1238 (letter to Laski of April 18, 1930).
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Holmes may have displayed some lurking ambivalence, toward a relativistic
view, in suggesting to Laski that:
If a man makes a great fortune by selling some patent medicine to
the crowd, that shows that in those circumstances the crowd wants
it-and I can see no justification in a government's undertaking to rec-
tify social desires-except upon an aristocratic assumption that you
know what is good for them better than they-(which no doubt you
do).49
Such views are hardly idiosyncratic with Justice Holmes. More recently,
Justice Blackmun observed that "[r]elativistic notions of right and wrong...
have achieved in recent times a disturbingly high level of prominence in this
country, both in the guise of law reform, and as a justification of conduct
that persons would normally eschew as immoral and even illegal." '50
Justice Blackmun is doubtless right in detecting strong subjectivist and
relativistic tendencies in contemporary jurisprudence. Without adopting the
labels of subjectivism or relativism, Professor Bruce Ackerman, for example,
sets down as a basic principle of the legitimate exercise of legal authority
that "[n]o reason is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert...
that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his
fellow citizens.... " 51 Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, not ordinarily thought
of for his intellectual affinities with Professor Ackerman, has written that
"[tihere is no conceivable way in which I can logically demonstrate to you
that the judgments of my conscience are superior to the judgments of your
conscience, and vice versa.' '5 2 Of course, the basic Rehnquist "project" is
nevertheless to retain the authoritative or morally binding quality of the
Constitution. But there is some tension in the Rehnquist approach. Chief
Justice Rehnquist views the Constitution, drafted and entered into long
before the birth of any of us, and to which many citizens have not volunta-
rily consented in any active, familiar sense of the term, as nonetheless mor-
ally binding on us all. Rehnquist's view may ultimately depend at least in
part on a judgment of his own conscience, a judgment that cannot necessar-
ily be made rationally convincing to anyone who doubts itA3
A related theme often associated with long-term societal decline is that
of the increasing secularization of major social institutions.54 Professor Joad
refers to this process as a possible mechanism of social decay: "When the
49. 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAR-
OLD J. LASKI 732 (M. DeWolfe Howe ed. 1953) (letter to Laski of July 23, 1925).
50. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 765 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
51. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11 (1980). For a variety of criti-
ques of Professor Ackerman's general theory, see generally the symposium in 93 ETHICS 328 (1983).
52. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693, 704 (1976).
53. Cf. D. GAUTHIER, MoRALs BY AGREEMENT (1986) (developing a subjectivist-relativist
account); A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 6 (2d ed. 1984) ("There seems to be no rational way of
securing moral agreement in our culture"); J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG
15 (1977) ("There are no objective values"); B. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSO-
PHY 22-26 (1985) (discussing the difficulty of persuasively undermining the views of the ethical skep-
tic who wishes simply to consistently opt out of the use of all moral language); 63 MONIST 3 (1980)
(the three Carus Lectures of William Frankena with accompanying replies).
54. See C. JOAD, supra note 5, at 100 ("The absence of strong, religious belief is a familiar
characteristic of so-called decadent ages"); W. DURANT & A. DURANT, supra note 19, at 92-93
(describing a possible general decadence scenario involving increased secularization).
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foundations of the Christian code in Christian belief were sapped, it was
unlikely that the superstructure of morals which was raised upon them
would indefinitely survive. Nor has it done so." 55 This rather severe analy-
sis has more recently been at least partially echoed by Daniel Bell's observa-
tion of the "erosion of the Protestant ethic and the Puritan temper."'56 Obf
course, whether increasing secularization in fact contributes to long-term so-
cietal decline in the particular case of any individual society is hardly free
from debate.57
Three additional, closely related themes recurring in discussions of so-
cial decline are those of an increase in hedonism or pleasure-orientation, a
perceived general weakening in the exercise of self-control, self-discipline,
and self-restraint, and an increasing tendency for societal decisionmaking to
reflect a relatively short-term orientation. Of course, such phenomena, even
if clarified conceptually, will pose monumental difficulties for precise mea-
surement. However, we have no guarantees that the phenomena that really
do attend long-term societal decline will be open to precise measurement. If
they are not, we should think twice about ignoring them judicially merely
because they cannot be easily quantified.
Professor Joad develops the hedonism thesis in the following terms: "in
so far as we attempt to estimate the worth of experience, we shall do so by
reference to a single standard, the degree of its pleasurableness. '5 8 A bit
more subtlely, insofar as experience is valued "for its own sake, we shall tend
to hold that the more intense and the more various the experience the better
. . . ."9 There is a resulting tendency toward a jading of the appetite, with
dissatisfaction being avoided only by experiencing the novel and
unfamiliar. 60
It has similarly been suggested that, at least in the popular estimation,
one characteristic of a decadent society is its loss of self-discipline.61 In the
modem era, it is often suggested, an ethic of self-expression has largely sup-
planted one of self-control,62 and an imbalance has developed between the
pursuit of individual rights and the obligations of citizenship.63 Alexander
Solzhenitsyn has observed in particular that the "legalistic" quality of many
of our social relationships is by its nature inhospitable to self-restraint, sacri-
55. C. Joad, supra note 5, at 108.
56. D. BELL, supra note 28, at 55. Recall Max Weber's observations that the modem de-coup-
ling of work from the highest spiritual and cultural values will result eventually in "[s]pecialists
without spirit, sensualists without heart . M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE
SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 182 (1958).
57. See Bliese, Christopher Dawson: His Interpretation of History, 23 MODERN AGE 259, 260
(1979) (discussing Dawson's view that "a secular society will sooner or later disintegrate"). But see
generally K. NEILSEN, ETHICS WITHotr GOD (1973).
58. C. JOAD, supra note 5, at 117.
59. Id.
60. See Winthrop, supra note 5, at 518 (discussing Professor Joad's theory).
61. See White, supra note 1, at 357.
62. See, eg., Wilson, The Rediscovery of Character Private Virtue and Public Policy, 81 PUB.
INT. 3, 13 (1985).
63. See A. SOLZHENrrSYN, supra note 38; Janowitz, Observations on the Sociology of Citizen-
ship: Obligations and Rights, 59 SOCIAL FORCES 1 (1980). For further developments of this theme
by Professor Janowitz, see M. JANOWITZ, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PATRIOTISM: EDUCATION
FOR CIVIC CONSCIOUSNESS (1985).
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fice, and selfless risk.64 This point is echoed by Professor James Q. Wilson,
who notes that the American Republic is not structured so as to combat
societal decay through means such as the inculcation of virtue or self-re-
straint.65 Instead, our constitutional system emphasizes ingenious, if imper-
fect, institutional or structural restraints on anticipated selfish action.66
One possible recent manifestation of a long-term loss of social self-re-
straint may be the increasing trend toward intergenerational wealth transfer
from future to current generations through inessential public borrowing. It
has always been possible for current generations to enrich themselves at the
expense of their successors through borrowing. Yet only recently have we
indulged in this possibility on a large scale. While this is no doubt in part
attributable to the rise of Keynesian macroeconomics, it may also be attribu-
table to an erosion of the "Victorian" moral inhibition against embracing
policies of this sort.67
This phenomenon may exemplify an increasing emphasis on short-term
considerations on the part of both government and business and private citi-
zens generally. Professor Wilson discusses the admittedly judgment-laden
claim that people may discount the future "too heavily."' 68 In this he follows
the descriptive observations of writers such as the economist Joseph
Schumpeter, who detected a shrinking of governmental and business time-
horizons to emphasize short-term considerations.69 Government policy may,
in emphasizing the short term, reflect the influence of the general
populace.70
This brief survey of some of the phenomena that are widely thought to
attend or follow from, if not cause, social decline is largely integrated in
Plato's famous idealized depiction of the decline and fall of democratic soci-
ety. In Plato's account, the democratic state, having already declined from
an oligarchical stage, and in the course of its logical, if not practically inevi-
table, descent into tyranny, bears certain recognizable characteristics. These
include the society's freedom, frankness, variety, forgiving spirit, and delight
in short-term consequences. 71
Plato further depicts the democratic character as rejecting the sugges-
tion that some pleasures are the result of satisfaction of good and noble
64. A. SOLZHENITSYN, supra note 38, at 17.
65. Wilson, supra note 62, at 14.
66. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS Nos. 10 and 51 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (discussing the multi-
plication of diverse factions and the necessity of ambition being made to counteract ambition). See
also Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985) (discussing the
role of civic virtue republican thought among the founders).
67. See Wilson, supra note 62, at 10-11 (referring to the observations of Professor James
Buchanan).
68. Id. at 5.
69. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 161 (3d ed. 1962). See also
Buchanan, supra note 40, at 84 n.6.
70. See Winthrop, supra note 5, at 518-19; Buchanan, supra note 40, at 84 n.6. Friedrich Nietz-
sche, whose judgments about social decay admittedly tend toward the idiosyncratic, observed that
"[d]isintegration characterizes this time, and thus uncertainty: nothing stands firmly on its feet or on
a hard faith in itself, one lives for tomorrow, as the day after tomorrow is dubious." F. NIETZSCHE,
THE WILL To POWER 40 (W. Kaufmann ed. 1967).
71. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, in 2 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 326-27 (B. Jowett trans. 1954).
One notes again here the appealing quality of some aspects of societal decline.
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desires, and others of evil desires, and as accepting the theory that all desires
are on a par, and that "one is as good as another."72 Self-discipline, for the
democratic character, is simply another passing fancy, capriciously and fleet-
ingly engaged in.73 A primary motivation for the democratic character is
the quest for immediately pleasurable experience. 74 As well, the extension
of equality eventually begins to subvert any real sense of community in the
democratic society: "the metic [i.e., resident alien] is equal with the citizen
and the citizen with the metic, and the stranger is quite as good as either."75
In this, Plato was no doubt influenced by his own surroundings. It has been
argued, for example, that "[p]ermissiveness and easy escape from legal pen-
alties were no doubt real signs of weakening community sense in fourth-
century Athens .... ,,76
Plato, alone and in conjunction with the contemporary writers dis-
cussed above, provides a picture in theory of a society in long-term decline.
But it is also possible to look to history for some assistance in envisioning
long-term societal decline. For example, whether it is fair or accurate to do
SO, 7 7 the waning days of the Western Roman Empire are often thought of as
the quintessence of historical decadence. No less a figure than Max Weber
has argued, in the context of his discussion of the Roman decline, that "we
can learn little or nothing for our contemporary social problems from an-
cient history."78 But logic does not compel this skeptical conclusion that
history is nothing more than a series of unprecedented discontinuities. It is
reasonable instead to simply not lose sight of the undoubtedly numerous
respects in which a contemporary decadent society, or our own society, must
significantly differ from that of Rome in decline.79
Commonly cited among the alleged contributing factors to Roman de-
cline is the excessive size, power, and arbitrariness of the bureaucratic Ro-
man civil service.80 By the late Roman Empire, the bureaucracy's red tape,
inefficiency, and intransigence, as well as its corruption, had become increas-
ingly common. 81 The sheer size of the bureaucracy required a heavy tax
burden, despite periodic reform efforts,82 and the burden was borne dispro-
72. Id. at 332.
73. Id.
74. See C. JOAD, supra note 5, at 102-03.
75. PLATO, supra note 71, at 334.
76. Skemp, The Causes of Decadence in Plato's Republic, 17 GOV'T & OPPOSrrION 80, 86
(1982). For a depiction of Athenian democratic society in less decadent colors, see Pericles' funeral
oration in THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 145-47 (R. Warner trans. 1954).
77. See R. GILMAN, supra note 6, at 65 (noting, but ultimately rejecting, our common mythic
ascription of decadence to the late Roman Empire).
78. Weber, The Social Causes of the Decay of Ancient Civilization, 5 J. GEN. EDUC. 75, 76
(1950).
79. See R. ADAMS, supra note 1, at 123-24 (discussing a wide variety of respects in which our
society differs in kind or degree from that of the declining Western Roman Empire).
80. See, eg., Loewe, Decline and Fall in East and West, 19 ARCHIVES EUR. SOC. 168, 177
(1978).
81. See Antonio, The Contradiction of Domination and Production in Bureaucracy: The Contri-
bution of Organizational Efficiency to the Decline of the Roman'Empire, 44 AM. Soc. REV. 895, 904
(1979); Jones, The Social Political, and Religious Changes During the Last Period of the Roman
Empire, in THE DECLINE OF EMPIRES 67, 69 (S. Eisenstadt ed. 1967).
82. See Jones, supra note 81, at 75.
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portionately by small rather than large landowners.8 3 Not surprisingly, the
swelling of the bureaucracy was associated with endemic inflation.8 4
Among the other widely cited conditions attendant upon Roman de-
cline are: the decline of public-spiritedness, 8 5 of the martial virtues, and of
sacrifice for one's country;8 6 a politics increasingly focusing on redistribu-
tion of wealth and self-interested bloc voting as opposed to sober debate of
the common good;8 7 a decreasing ratio of net economic producers to net
economic consumers;8 8 an army of insufficient strength in proportion to its
assumed responsibilities;8 9 and even a diminution in the clarity, vigor, and
forcefulness of principle embodied in Roman statutory law.90
One other phenomenon worthy of comment bears on the matter of Ro-
man citizenship. Rome was eventually forced, despite its original intentions,
to grant Roman citizenship to all territorial inhabitants, with the exception
of slaves.9 1 The merits of this policy aside, the historical example of Rome
suggests two reasons why long-term societal decline may go unchecked.
First, social phenomena do not come pejoratively labeled as "decadent." An
extension of the bequest of citizenship appears most obviously to be a pro-
gressive, liberal reform underpinned by the value of equality. The less obvi-
ous, or less immediate, consequence of extending citizenship through the
political decisionmaking process was a "devaluation" or attenuation of Ro-
man citizenship, a consequence which further impaired the sense of Roman
community.
The second reason why long-term societal decline may go unchecked is
that such equivocal measures as extension of citizenship may be perfectly
rational from the standpoint of the beneficiaries of extended citizenship.
Most political systems tend to take intensity of preference into account in
some fashion or another, and it seems quite possible that a person who stood
to become a Roman citizen would have gained far more in the way of bene-
fits from becoming a citizen than he would have lost as a result of his own
minimal contribution to the dilution of what it distinctively meant to be a
Roman citizen. The potential citizen's interests may well lie in a broad grant
of citizenship to those with whom he shares common interests. Those inter-
ests may also be largely shared by some fraction of those who have already
attained citizenship status, and who thus may have greater political influ-
ence. Crucially, the potential citizen, and his allies, may have more to gain
from extension of citizenship than will generally be lost individually by each
of those who are already citizens, and who will doubtless be compensated at
least in part by the greater availability of the distinctive talents of the new
citizens. Extension of citizenship, in each particular instance, will tend to
stimulate stronger intensity of preference and greater exertions among
83. See Antonio, supra note 81, at 907.
84. See Loewe, supra note 80, at 178.
85. See Jones, supra note 81, at 67.
86. See Molnar, supra note 5, at 399.
87. See id
88. See Dawson, supra note 17, at 9; Jones, supra note 81, at 74-75.
89. See Loewe, supra note 80, at 178.
90. See id at 176.
91. See id at 173.
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would-be citizens than among members of the latter group. Thus, long-term
societal decline, in the form of the reduced meaningfulness of citizenship, is
able to proceed because, among other reasons, it "arrives" only in the long
term and is initially an abstraction, it may be tied to progressive reforms,
and the logic of political decisionmaking itself may on occasion promote it.
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
LONG-TERM SOCIETAL DECLINE
The contemporary judicial system's reactions to the phenomena associ-
ated above with long-term societal decline have been mixed. Discussed be-
low are three judicial opinions chosen to illustrate the diversity of judicial
reaction to such phenomena; the cases were chosen essentially at random
from the range of cases in which courts made policy decisions bearing on
phenomena that are often associated with societal decline. The first case, an
admittedly extreme example, is the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court in
State v. Henry,92 in which the court broadly protected obscene expression
under the Oregon Constitution. Such an opinion embraces and affirms the
undeniably positive side of phenomena the obverse of which may be associ-
ated with long-term societal decline. In the second case selected, United
States v. Salerno,93 the Supreme Court upheld pretrial detention of criminal
suspects based on predictions of their future dangerousness in an opinion
that implicitly, but only implicitly, showed greater sensitivity to long-term
historical trends and their constitutional implications. Finally, this Article
briefly considers Plyler v. Doe94 and related cases, in which, it is argued, the
courts are swamped by the depth and complexity of the broad philosophical
and long-term policy issues inherent in questions of the constitutional rights
of undocumented aliens to state services as well as other issues involving
immigration, state and federal sovereignty, and the nature of membership in
the political community.
Decadence and Obscene or Offensive Expression
The Oregon Supreme Court case of State v. Henry95 represents a logical
extension of developing trends in the area of offensive, vulgar, or obscene 96
speech. The court in Henry held broadly that allegedly obscene speech is
generally protected by the free speech provision of the Oregon Constitu-
tion.97 Perhaps the essence of the Oregon Supreme Court's opinion is
caught in the court's conclusion that:
[A]Ithough Oregon's pioneers brought with them a diversity of highly
moral as well as irreverent views, we perceive that most members of
92. 302 Or. 510, 732 P.2d 9 (1987).
93. 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
94. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
95. 302 Or. 510, 732 P.2d 9 (1987).
96. Unless the context suggests otherwise, "obscene" herein is intended to refer to material that
might be thought to fall within the general scope of the Court's test in cases such as Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and is not intended to refer only to the legal conclusion that the
material actually fails the Miller or other applicable obscenity test.
97. Henry, 302 Or. at 525, 732 P.2d at 17.
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the Constitutional Convention of 1857 were rugged and robust individ-
uals dedicated to founding a free society unfettered by the governmen-
tal imposition of some people's views of morality on the free expression
of others.98
Of course, the aim of this paper is not to take issue with the decision in
Henry. Instead, it is important to note how phenomena often associated
with social decline can be converted to objects of pride through a combina-
tion of creative characterization and de facto ethical relativism. This crea-
tive characterization is the court's response to the nagging fear that
pornography may be "out of control" in the sense of being more pervasive
and extreme now than formerly,99 with the pervasiveness and extremity of
the materials exceeding what is thought desirable by most adults, or even by
many consumers of pornography. Even the complete demise of any stan-
dards at all can be characterized as evidence of "robustness," of "non-prud-
ishness," of "ruggedness," 10 or as reflecting pluralism and diversity.
Unfortunately, if a society is in fact in the process of fragmenting, prais-
ing it as diverse, open, and pluralistic may not be sufficient to restore it to
health. A society in which the depth and breadth of common values are
decreasing may be in the process of losing collective confidence and declin-
ing, even while we celebrate the society's pluralism. There may be some self-
delusion in deciding simply to choose the more favorable characterization.
Certainly, our greatest liberal writers, such as John Stuart Mill, have empha-
sized the values of pluralism and diversity. 101 But not without limits. It has
been rightly observed that "[n]either Mill nor others like him have ever ar-
gued for a society pluralist to its roots. Indeed, the liberty they plead for
only makes sense within a society that strives after the highest ideals of the
West; within a society, that is, committed to rational enquiry . .. . 02
Similarly, the Oregon Supreme Court in Henry at no point explicitly
contrasts relativist with non-relativist views of the true nature of morality,
finding the former convincing on the merits. Instead, the court in Henry
seems to assume that the abolition of obscenity laws should follow from the
observable fact that people's views of morality differ, together with the prem-
ise that rugged individualism characterizes Oregon's constitutional framers
and is itself a desirable quality. It appears unwarranted, then, to permit"governmental imposition of some people's views of morality on the free
expression of others."103
The Oregon Supreme Court's de facto ethical relativism is neither ex-
treme nor unusual. Perhaps the most familiar kindred statement is that of
Justice Harlan for the Court in Cohen v. California.1° 4 In the context of
98. Id. at 523, 732 P.2d at 16.
99. Even if we assume that the rugged Oregonians of 1857 were so diffident as to not presume
to set any obscenity standards at all for later generations, it is difficult to imagine that they would
find mass circulation of even non-obscene publications such as Hustler and Penthouse as anything
short of inconceivable.
100. Henry, 302 Or. at 523, 732 P.2d at 16.
101. See generally J.S. MILL, ON LaERTY (D. Spitz ed. 1975).
102. White, supra note 1, at 360-61.
103. Henry, 302 Or. at 523, 732 P.2d at 17.
104. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
[Vol, 30
1988] JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO LONG-TERM SOCIETAL DECLINE 285
adjudicating the status of the "distasteful" anti-draft slogan emblazoned on
Cohen's jacket, Justice Harlan declared that "it is ... often true that one
man's vulgarity is another's lyric."105 Similarly, Justice Harlan concluded,"governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area
... ." 106 Justice Harlan apparently viewed the underlying issue as a matter
of "taste and style."10 7 Justice Harlan's language is in fact often cited in a
more extreme version, without his qualification as to what is "often true,"
resulting in the flat relativism that "one man's vulgarity is another's
lyric."10 8 Echoes of Justice Harlan's approach can be heard in Justice
Douglas' observation that "what may be trash to me may be prized by
others" 10 9 and in the Court's more general formulation that "[w]hat seems
to one to be trash may have for others fleeting or even enduring values."' 110
At least one court, in an alleged indecent public language case, has explicitly
interpreted the Cohen analysis as viewing "obscenity" as "subjective-a rela-
tive matter." 11
As we have seen,11 2 relativism and subjectivism are often thought to be
associated with societal decadence. But if the courts make no such connec-
tion between relativism and decadence, their response to an increase over
time in arguably offensive public language or to obscenity is likely to en-
courage or tacitly promote such phenomena. A court attuned to the possi-
bility of decadence is likely to view a perceived historical increase in
offensive language or obscenity with some concern. But to a relativist-
minded court, not attuned to the possibility of decadence, an increase over
time in arguably offensive public language or obscenity takes on a self-vali-
dating quality.
The Fifth Circuit, for example, in Bazaar v. Fortune 11 3 referred to the
arguably objectionable language at issue as "no longer really that unu-
sual,"1 14 perceived a "trend"1 1 5 toward its use, and observed, without en-
dorsing the language at issue, that "things considered horribly 'indecent' a
few years ago are quite commonplace today."1 1 6 To a decadence theorist,
105. Id. at 25.
106. Id. See also Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection,
9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 20 (1974) (Cohen as indicating Court's "inability to draw a conclusive
line between offensive language and other language").
107. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
108. See, eg., State v. Authelet, 120 R.I. 42, 54, 385 A.2d 642, 648 (1978).
109. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 137 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
110. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc. 327 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1946), quoted in Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct.
1918, 1927 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Fowler v. Board of Educ., 819 F.2d 657, 668-69
(6th Cir. 1987) (Merritt, J., dissenting) ("what one judge sees as 'gross and bizarre,' another may find
... mild and not very 'sexually suggestive' ").
111. People v. Klein, 67 Mich. App. 556, 557, 242 N.W.2d 436, 437 (1976) (per curiam). See
also Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor Bickel, Justice Harlan, and the Endur-
ing Significance of Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283, 299 (distinction between "vulgarity"
and "lyric" as "subjective" in nature).
112. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
113. 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd en banc as modified, 489 F.2d 225 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974).




this state of affairs might be cause for concern. To a relativist theorist, the
same state of affairs shows most crucially the increasingly broad popularity,
or at least acceptance, of the language at issue. For a relativist court, the
step from popular acceptance to judicial acceptability is hardly noticeable.
It is possible to seek to allay the fears of the decadence theorist in this
regard by assuming that the use of language predictably offensive to some of
one's audience is simply to be expected to increase in an era of sustained
political and social conflict." 7 But this does not seem a particularly con-
vincing explanation for the more frequent use of intentionally offensive lan-
guage. The language for which persons such as the defendant in Cohen have
been prosecuted has been technically available throughout the course of the
virtually unceasing political and social conflict endemic to American polit-
ical history. Further, in view of the increased stakes, it is not obvious why
an increase in political and social conflict should not tend to drive out inten-
tionally or predictably offensive language in favor of more cogent or other-
wise persuasive language. More importantly, though, it should not be
assumed that the typical offensive language case at the appellate level is
deeply imbued with political and social issues, at least in any direct sense.
Most such cases are not." 8
Instead, the more convincing explanation for the historical increase in
offensive language, or of the use of particular profanities, as well as for cases
such as Henry, may lie in the "erosion of the Protestant ethic and the Puri-
tan temper,"' 19 which were ordinarily thought of as "codes that emphasized
work, sobriety, frugality, [and] sexual restraint .... ,,120 The increasing
doubts about the judicial imposition of such values may be simply one more
respect in which "the typical bourgeoise is rapidly losing faith in his own
creed."121
With the partial demise of traditional rigorous systems of public morals
in these areas, the Supreme Court has naturally tended to minimize consid-
eration of the most abstract, ephemeral kinds of alleged injuries. The Court
has tended to exclude "claims of harms to 'sensibilities' as a justification for
suppression of offensive language. It has recognized as a valid state interest
only the prevention of violent reactive conduct and has been willing to as-
sume the likelihood of such behavior only in the narrow case of fighting
words."'122 If the courts are not particularly attuned to the possibility of
gradual, long-term societal decline, they will quite naturally tend to focus on
117. See Rutzick, supra note 106, at 1.
118. A fairer sense of the nature of the reported cases can be derived from cases such as Wilson
v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1985); Bovey v. City of Lafayette, 586 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D.
Ind. 1984), aff'd memL, 774 F.2d 1166 (7th Cir. 1985); People v. John V., 167 Cal. App. 3d 761, 213
Cal. Rptr. 503 (1985); Cavazos v. State, 455 N.E.2d 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); State v. John W., 418
A.2d 1097 (Me. 1980); Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 489 Pa. 254, 414 A.2d 54, appeal dismissed,
449 U.S. 894 (1980); City of Seattle v. Camby, 104 Wash. 2d 49, 701 P.2d 499 (1985) (en banc).
119. D. BELL, supra note 28, at 55.
120. Id.
121. J. SCHUMPETER, supra note 69, at 161. For a statement of Justice Scalia's absence of faith
in the availability of ascertainable standards in the area of obscenity, see Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct.
1918, 1923 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
122. Rutzick, supra note 106, at 27.
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the risk of only the most tangible, immediate, concrete sorts of harms. 123
Even under the broadest analysis, if the courts see no risk of promoting soci-
etal decline, they will not pause to balance any risks of contribution to socie-
tal decline against even a very slight perceived risk legislative or judicial
oppression.1 24 If no tangible harm can be shown to befall the immediate
parties, the courts are likely to feel that the only alternative grounds for
failing to protect the challenged conduct must be some moral code that is
not universally shared.1 25
But the possibility of gradual, long-term societal decline, or such mat-
ters as the gradual loss of a sense of community in particular,1 26 is neither
concrete, nor tangible, nor immediate, nor clear cut and unequivocal. One
person's loss of community is another person's enhanced pluralism. Such
sorts of alleged harms certainly do not fit within the kind of clear-and-pres-
ent-danger analysis with which we are most comfortable in the general free
speech area. 127 While it seems undeniable that there can be such a thing as a
moral climate or moral environment, 128 however amorphous, and that such
things can be culturally important, and can change arguably for the worse,
such considerations may be too ineffable for a judiciary to manage. To the
extent that our social life is organized "legalistically," the problems of offen-
sive or obscene speech may not be soluble in the long run.129
Decadence, Criminality, and Preventive Detention
Each society unavoidably strikes some sort of balance between minimiz-
ing the pretrial confinement of accused persons and enhancing the public
safety and community integrity. Where the society initially chooses to strike
the balance is a matter largely of political philosophy. While an emphasis on
the "liberty interests" of criminal suspects seems natural to us, at least some
historical liberals have expressed misgivings on this score. The Enlighten-
ment pillar Condorcet, for example, considered the primary and most im-
portant of the rights of man to be "[s]ecurity of the person, which includes
the assurance that one will not be disturbed by any violence .... ,,130 Con-
dorcet's logic was in part that "the man who has never feared outrages
against his person acquires a more elevated and compassionate soul; ... the
123. See Farber, supra note 111, at 292.
124. This may help account, for example, for the Court's decision in the commercial nude danc-
ing case of Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
125. See, eg., Justice Tobriner's argument in Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 441, 509 P.2d
497, 521-22, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681, 705-06 (1973) (en bane) (Tobriner, J., dissenting), overruled, Morris
v. Municipal Court, 32 Cal. 3d 553, 652 P.2d 51, 186 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1982) (per curiam). Justice
Richardson, in turn dissenting in Morris, sought unsuccessfully to have the court consider the risk to
an already "declining sense of community" posed by overruling Crownover. Id. at 576, 652 P.2d at
65, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 508 (Richardson, J., dissenting). On societal decline and the loss of commu-
nity, see supra note 91 and accompanying text; and supra text accompanying notes 131-79.
126. See Justice Richardson's dissent in Morris, 32 Cal. 3d at 576, 652 P.2d at 65, 186 Cal. Rptr.
at 508 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
127. See A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 73 (1975). For a statement of the clear and
present danger principle in the context of subversive advocacy, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969).
128. See A. BICKEL, supra note 127, at 72.
129. See A. SOLZHENITSYN, supra note 38, at 21.
130. CONDORCET, SELECTED WRITINGS 73 (K. Baker ed. 1976).
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individual whose property is always assured finds probity easy .... ",131
Where the balance is initially struck, or the way a constitutional provi-
sion is initially interpreted, though, may be subject to change, depending in
part on changes in historical circumstances. A theory of long-term societal
decline would predict that perceived decline would inspire, among other re-
sponses, political efforts at resisting that decline. To the degree that the
courts are willing to accommodate political adjustments in the balancing of a
suspect's liberty of movement and against a society's real or perceived phys-
ical security and sense of community, the courts play a role in the society's
general response to perceived decline, even if the courts' reasoning does not
explicitly refer to any such considerations.
This is of course one way of viewing the recent Supreme Court case of
United States v. Salerno.132 The Court majority in Salerno upheld from con-
stitutional attack the Bail Reform Act of 1984.133 The Bail Reform Act in
question permits judges to order pretrial detention of arrestees charged with
committing certain serious crimes if, after adversary hearing, the govern-
ment can show by clear and convincing evidence that no less burdensome
combination of pretrial release conditions will suffice to reasonably assure
the safety of particular individuals and the public in general.' 34
The Court in Salerno rejected the claim that the statute amounted to an
attempt to punish suspects based on inevitably crude predictions of future
antisocial conduct.1 35 In the Court's analysis, predicted dangerousness had
not been criminalized by the statute. Rather, the Congress was seeking, if
imperfectly, to cope with an "alarming" 136 problem of crimes committed by
persons on bail release. The government interest in the balance took the
compelling form of "that primary concern of every government-a concern
for the safety and indeed lives of its citizens .... -137
It is of course not the aim of this Article to pass judgment on the merits
of Salerno. Salerno stands as a judicial accommodation of a congressional
enactment that may be viewed as a predictable response to perceived societal
decline, in which Congress adjusts the weights in the pan of the various in-
terests involved, whether Congress actually conceives of the statute explicitly
as a response to "decline" or "decadence" or not. It seems clear that long-
term societal decline may evoke, or provoke, political responses of various
sorts, even if political decisionmakers do not consciously conceive of the
problem as one of reacting in some fashion to decline.
131. Id. at 77.
132. 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
133. In particular, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. I1 1985).
134. Id. at §§ (e)-(i).
135. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101. For contrasting views, see the Second Circuit majority in
United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987); United States v.
Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986) (opinion of Newman, J.); Alschuler, Preventive Pre-
trial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REv.
510, 568 (1986). For discussions of the risks and likelihood of predictive overconfidence, see Zimr-
ing & Hawkins, Dangerousness and Criminal Justice, 85 MICH. L. REV. 481 (1986); Comment, Pre-
ventive Detention: A Constitutional But Ineffective Means of Fighting Pretrial Crime, 77 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 439 (1986), and the widely cited A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 19-25 (1976).
136. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2098.
137. Id. at 2105.
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In the context of the Bail Reform Act, it can be said that even if the
nature and pervasiveness of predatory crime has not changed since the draft-
ing of the Constitution, at least our perceptions have, and for the worse. At
least as a matter of mythology, "[i]n a Jeffersonian democracy, crime is very
adequately controlled by the town constable, who supervises the local drunk,
shoplifter, and sneak thief ... ."138 From this reassuring historical starting
point, though, it has been argued that crime rates have trended upward, if
irregularly, 139 to the point where "long-term changes in crime rates exceed
anything that can be explained either by rational calculation or the varying
proportion of young males in the population." 140 Once other possible social
factors in generating this historical increase in predatory criminality are
given their say, 141 we are left essentially with a decline in what has been
thought of as "Victorian morality" to help account for the otherwise
inexplicable. 142
In the extreme, the perception has developed that "[t]he property I keep
in my house is my own by legal right--except that the law is quite unable to
protect me from thieves, burglars, and vandals." 143 There is a sense that
contemporary criminal jurisprudence has, over the long term, become gener-
ally less capable of decisively imposing "punitive" judgments for which the
judiciary might feel direct moral responsibility, as in the face to face sentenc-
ing of a criminal defendant. The judiciary may feel even less responsibility
for the merely indirect, unintended consequences in the form of innocent,
but unidentifiable, persons being victimized by felony suspects on bail or by
paroled convicted felons. 144 Undue difficulty in imposing rational criminal
sanctions has long been thought to be an indicator of democratic societies in
decline. 145 Certainly, a rational citizen could examine the available statistics
on the median time to parole of convicted felons146 and conclude that our
society has become ambivalent about criminal confinement, at least to the
degree that prisoners are released without substantial assurance to the com-
munity that they will not likely engage in serious criminal misconduct upon
release.
138. R. ADAMS, supra note 1, at 160.
139. See, e.g., L. RADZINOWICZ, THE GROWTH OF CRIME 6-7 (1977), and the detail provided
by the annual UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES. See also C. SILBERMAN,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 40 (1978) (citing calculations of high probability of seri-
ous arrest for recent-born males). But see generally K. WRIGHT, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME
MYTH (1985).
140. J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 12-13 (1975). See also E. CURRIE, CONFRONTING
CRIME 9 (1985).
141. See generally J. WILSON, supra note 140.
142. Id.; see generally Wilson, supra note 62.
143. R. ADAMS, supra note 1, at 154. Of course, the perception of vulnerability to crime may be
objectively not fully warranted. See generally Taylor & Hale, Testing Alternative Models of Fear of
Crime, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 151 (1987).
144. See R. ADAMS, supra note 1, at 158-59.
145. See PLATO, supra note 71, at 327; Skemp, supra note 76, at 86; A. SOLZHENITSYN, supra
note 38, at 21-3.
146. See, eg., R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 182 (1973) (referring to statis-
tics indicating median time to parole of first degree robbers to be 45 months and of second degree
burglars to be 24 months). Sentences of two to four years of actual time served can be viewed by
many young criminals as an investment in criminal education during which period any gang associa-
tions, for example, can be preserved or enhanced.
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Of course, systematically failing to restrain convicted felons who give
no indication of posing a reduced danger of serious harm to the community
may be justifiable on a variety of grounds. But there are implications of such
a systematic failure that suggest a weakening of the collective will or a loss of
collective self-assurance, in ways consistent with a hypothesis of societal de-
cline. It is, or should be, widely appreciated that "[c]rime... undermines the
social order itself, by destroying the assumptions on which it is based." 147
Beyond some point, the perceived level of violence creates a "sense of social
disintegration,"' 148 a fraying of the social fabric, and the maintenance of
community is impaired. 14 9
At some level of awareness, the relevant features of the Bail Reform Act
of 1984 constitute a response, ratified by the Supreme Court against consti-
tutional challenge, to conditions that are widely thought of as indicative of
long-term societal decline. Of course, this is not to suggest that the Act is
likely to have any significant practical effect on crime rates,150 any more
than any of the variety of other anti-crime initiatives undertaken of late. 151
The Act may fail of its essential purpose. If it does, though, there arises a
certain irony. As Friedrich Nietzsche once observed in another context, a
multiplicity of failed reforms, in this case aimed at crime prevention, can
itself "create an overall impression as of decay-and perhaps even decay
itself."' 152
Decadence and the Problem of Membership in the Community
Membership in the civic community and the scope of a member's or
non-member's obligations toward and rights against the community are not
self-defining. At least implicitly, the community must act out answers to the
questions of who counts as a member, for what purposes, and to what de-
gree. The most generous sort of answer amounts to a determination that
everyone who is conceivably a member, or who wishes to be a member, in
fact counts as a member, in all respects, equally. But while the most gener-
ous answer may reflect the most generous motives, as well as a recognition of
the benefits new members will confer on a society, it may also reflect difficul-
ties in engaging in strategic thinking, casualness toward the concepts of com-
munity and sovereignty, or other indicia of long-term societal decline.
As we have seen, 153 Plato observed of the declining democratic society
that "the metic [resident alien] is equal with the citizen and the citizen with
the metic, and the stranger is quite as good as either." 154 Any distasteful
elitist overtones aside, however, our society, of course faces similar issues of
status, of inclusion and exclusion, and of the perquisites of membership and
non-membership. Among the most dramatic contexts in which such issues
147. C. SILBERMAN, supra note 139, at 12.
148. E. CURRIE, supra note 140, at 5.
149. See J. WILSON, supra note 140, at 21.
150. See J. CONRAD, THE DANGEROUS AND THE ENDANGERED 83 (1985); Comment, supra
note 135, at 472-76.
151. See E. CURRIE, supra note 140, at 7.
152. F. NImTZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 40 (W. Kaufmann ed. 1967).
153. See supra text accompanying note 75.
154. PLATO, supra note 71, at 334.
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arise are those involving the asserted rights of undocumented aliens. The
most important of such cases is Plyler v. Doe, 155 a Supreme Court decision
attractive both for its undeniable generosity of spirit and, in certain limited
respects, its foresightedness and concern for the future.
Plyler involved an equal protection challenge to a Texas statutory policy
denying state funds for public school education of undocumented alien chil-
dren and authorizing local school districts to deny public school enrollment
to such children. The Supreme Court, while declining to view undocu-
mented alien children as members of a "suspect class,"15 6 and while refus-
ing to accord to a basic public school education the status of a "fundamental
right,"157 nevertheless struck down the statute as not rationally furthering
any substantial and legitimate state goal.1 58
The basic policy logic of the majority in Plyler was essentially that the
Texas statute imposed
a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for
their disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the
rest of their lives. By denying these children a basic education, we
deny them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institu-
tions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in
even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation. In determining
the rationality of [the Texas statute], we may appropriately take into
account its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are its
victims.159
The Court went on to recognize a state's hypothetical desire to control the
internal effects of an influx of undocumented immigrants, but pronounced
that the Texas statute in question was an ineffectual way of responding to a
probably nonexistent problem. 160 The Court observed that the predominant
motivation for undocumented entry into Texas is presumably geared to em-
ployment opportunities, not educational benefits for one's children.' 61 As
long as mere legal deportability of the children does not ensure immediate
actual deportation, 62 the Court concluded, "[i]t is difficult to understand
precisely what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and
perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding
to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime." 163
The compassion and, in some respects, foresightedness of the majority
opinion in Plyler is clear, and is freely granted even by the Plyler dissent-
ers. 64 To a degree, though, Plyler fails to come to grips with some of the
155. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
156. Id. at 219 n.19.
157. Id. at 221, 223.
158. Id. at 224, 224 n.21, 230. For a sense of some of the scholarly response to Plyler, see, eg.,
Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982 Sup. Cr. REv. 167
(P. Kurland, G. Casper & D. Hutchinson eds. 1983), as well as the contributions by Professors
Perry, Lichtenberg, Gerety, Rosberg, and Hull for a symposium in 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 329 (1983).
159. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24.
160. Id. at 228.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 226.
163. Id. at 230.
164. Id. at 242, 252-53 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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deepest lurking problems. Its analysis of the legitimate role of the state, for
example, seems flawed in certain respects. To adopt for a moment the lan-
guage of the philosophers, Plyler's analysis of the state and its legitimate
activities is too purely telelogical, and insufficiently deontological. By this is
meant simply that Plyler presumes that a state may justify its actions only in
terms of the state's pursuit of goals, or interests, or some sort of desirable
end to be striven for. A state might seek to justify draining a swamp, for
example, in terms of aiming at the "end" of protecting the public health.
But teleological explanations do not exhaust the range of explanations a state
might give for a particular decision. A state might enact a particular statute
not in attempt to achieve good consequences, but because the state, or its
citizens, deem it the right thing to do, independent of consequences which
may or may not be achieved. One aspect of this latter sort of state activity
might include acts of the state that by their very enactment help to define the
state, or to establish the state as a particular kind of community, apart from
any practical consequences the act may generate. In such cases, the familiar
sort of constitutional scrutiny that in some fashion questions whether a given
means are well-suited for or will tend to advance a given state goal does not
fit.
What concerns us particularly, in our context, is the possibility that
judicial insensitivity to the possible legitimacy and importance of a state's
self-definitive or community-constitutive acts may bespeak, or promote, a
degree of societal decline. This is of course not to suggest that every popular
act of community self-definition or identity-building is either well-advised or
constitutional. Plyler, however, tends to imply that the necessity or impor-
tance of such self-definitive acts cannot outweigh or legitimize, in constitu-
tional terms, any substantial bad consequences flowing from such acts.
One way of casting doubt on Plyler in this particular respect is by notic-
ing the range and monumental differences among arguably legitimate com-
munity self-conceptions. Under Plyler, a non-member of the Texas
community may, without any prior relationship to the United States com-
munity, and without the concurrence or consent of Texas, 165 include him-
self within the Texas community, and take upon himself some number of the
community's benefits and burdens, simply through the illegal acts of enter-
ing and physically remaining within the borders of Texas. But this is hardly
the only conceivable way of constituting the Texas community. There may
be persons geographically closer to San Antonio than are the residents of
Austin and who currently receive none of the benefits of being a member of
the Texas community, solely because their desire for such benefits has not
led them to commit the illegal acts of entering and remaining within the
boundaries of Texas. Persons who do not violate federal immigration law
165. For a sense of the contemporary debate on the arguable necessity for mutual consent to
citizenship, see P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN
THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985); Helton, Book Review, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 221 (1986);
Martin, Membership and Consent: Abstract or Organic?, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 278 (1985); Neuman,
Book Review, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485 (1987); Schwartz, Book Review, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 2143
(1986). See also Schuck & Smith, Membership and Consent: Actual or Mythic? A Reply to David A.
Martin, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 545 (1986).
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may be no less attuned to American cultural and political values than those
who do. Yet the former do not count, while the latter must.
If it is thought to be obvious that those who do not violate federal immi-
gration law cannot count, at all, within the Texas community, it must be
noted that it was once widely thought obvious that freed former slaves could
not count as members of the American community. 166 In reality, the ques-
tion of who counts as a member, to what extent, and for what purposes, is
one that has provoked disparate answers among the leading contemporary
writers. One philosopher has, at the level of the nation-state, characterized a
leading issue in the following terms: "Does the right of a nation as it is at
present to its territory include the right to forbid or limit immigration, or to
deny full citizenship to immigrants and even to the locally born children of
immigrants?"' 167 In other contexts, we are ordinarily reluctant to severely
impair peoples' interests without according them some sort of political"voice" in the decision.
One well-known contemporary answer to the question of who counts, in
moral terms or who is entitled to share in the benefits of the community,
goes so far as to include those at a distant geographical and cultural remove,
and to a remarkable degree:
we ought to give until we reach the level of marginal utility-that is,
the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to
myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift. This would
mean, of course that one would reduce oneself to very near the mate-
rial circumstances of a Bengali refugee.' 68
It has been less dramatically argued that there is in fact no greater moral
obligation to relieve the suffering of geographically closer, as opposed to
more distant, peoples as long as the likelihood of effectiveness and the differ-
ences in costs of relief are properly accounted for.i 69
The range of possible answers to the community-defining question of
who counts as a member of the community, and who is entitled to share in
the benefits and burdens of community membership, is thus quite broad. 170
Conscientious citizens would consider such questions as of the first order of
importance, yet their importance is underemphasized by the excessive teleo-
logical approach of Plyler, which tends to take issues of community identity
for granted and focuses instead on issues of resolving, creating, and avoiding
bad consequences of goal-oriented state action.
166. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
167. J.L. MACKIE, supra note 53, at 179.
168. Singer, Famine, Affluence and Morality, in PHILOSOPHY, PoLrrICS AND SOCIETY 33 (P.
Laslett & J. Fishkin eds. fifth series 1979). This Article of course passes no judgment as to whether
it is really in the long-term interests of others for a person in Singer's position to substantially impov-
erish himself.
169. See J. FISHKIN, THE LiMITs OF OBLIGATION 73 (1982). For a variety of contemporary
philosophical perspectives on this subject, see the contributions of Professors Barry, Nielsen, Franck,
and Richards in 24 NOMOs: ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 219-302 (J.R. Pennock & J. Chap-
man eds. 1982).
170. See generally Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L.
REv. 306 (1986). It seems clear that the range of plausible answers to the question of who counts as
a member of the community, and to what degree, expands particularly as the society reaches a high
level of income and wealth. See Buchanan, supra note 40, at 75.
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The Plyler Court's insensitivity to issues of community and community
definition is even less justifiable once it is appreciated that the Court's own
approach is too simple even within its own sphere. Certainly, the young
children of undocumented aliens are morally innocent, 171 and the innocent
are not generally to be morally condemned. As well, it is implausible that
any significant number of persons would violate federal immigration solely
to enroll their children in Texas public schools.172 But the moral innocence
of a person does not always mandate exemption from practical burden, as we
know particularly from the affirmative action context.'73 And while the en-
try of undocumented aliens is doubtless ordinarily strongly motivated by
employment or wage differentials, 174 logic suggests that as the scope of fed-
eral and state rights and benefits of various sorts expands, 75 there will be an
increase in the percentage of undocumented immigrants whose presence is
attributable as much to the overall available benefit package as to the em-
ployment or wage differential component. 76
The world is thus more complex than the Plyler Court recognizes it to
be, even on its own terms. The choice faced by the Court in Plyler was not
essentially between enforcing an arbitrary state statute on the one hand, or
striking it down to prevent a moral abomination on the other. This is again
not to take issue with the result or judicial motivation in Plyler. It is reason-
able, however, to imagine that a community in long-term decline tends to
171. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
172. Id. at 228, 228 n.24.
173. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484-85 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.); A.
GOLDMAN, JUSTICE AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 102-20 (1979). But cf UAW v. Lyng, 648 F.
Supp. 1234, 1240 (D.D.C. 1986) (denial of foodstamps to striker as impermissibly burdening
striker's spouse and children).
174. See, eg., Bhagwati, U.S. Immigration Policy: What Next?, in ESSAYS ON LEGAL AND ILLE-
GAL IMMIGRATION 111, 118 (S. Pozo ed. 1986).
175. For a recent survey, see Wheeler & Leventhal, Aliens' Rights to Public Benefits, 20
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 913 (1986). For selected recent narrower discussions, see Nickel, Should
Undocumented Aliens Be Entitled to Medical Care?, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 19 (1986); Note, A
Human Rights Approach to the Labor Rights of Undocumented Workers, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1715
(1986). As a sampling of the relevant cases in areas other than educational rights, one might turn to
cases such as Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers' Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 717-18, 718
n.12 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing a wide range of cases involving recognition of legal rights of undocu-
mented immigrants, with emphasis on labor rights); Ruiz v. Blum, 549 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (federal and state funded day care benefits not deniable to otherwise eligible child on grounds
that mother cannot show lawfulness of her own presence within the United States); Gates v. Rivers
Const. Co., 515 P.2d 1020 (Alaska 1973) (employment contract of worker of undocumented status
at time of performance is judicially enforceable); Darces v. Woods, 35 Cal. 3d 871, 679 P.2d 458, 201
Cal. Rptr. 807 (1984) (en banc) (excluding undocumented siblings from consideration in determining
recipient's needs for AFDC purposes violates state constitutional guarantee of equal protection);
Dermegerdich v. Rank, 151 Cal. App. 3d 848, 199 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1984) (undocumented alien not
under deportation order is eligible for medical assistance benefits under state statute); Intermountain
Health Care, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 707 P.2d 1051 (Idaho 1985) (citizen through birth in United
States may not be denied county medical assistance benefits on grounds of parents' undocumented
status); Antillon v. Department of Employment Sec., 688 P.2d 455 (Utah 1984) (undocumented
immigrant entitled to state unemployment benefits where INS knowingly discontinues further depor-
tation proceedings against immigrant); Peterson v. Neme, 222 Va. 477, 281 S.E.2d 869 (1981) (un-
documented alien worker entitled to recover loss of wages in ordinary tort negligence action). But
see Zurmati v. McMahon, 180 Cal. App. 3d 164, 225 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1986) (alien for whom political
asylum determination was still pending was not permanently residing in United States under color of
law and thus not eligible for AFDC benefits).
176. See Chiswick, The Illegal Alien Policy Dilemma, in ESSAYS ON LEGAL AND ILLEGAL IM-
MIGRATION 73, 83 (1986); E. HARWOOD, IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW 17 (1986).
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attach less meaning to what we have called the deontological issues of com-
munity identity and community self-definition, as Rome in decline' 77 and
Plato's democracy in decline178 arguably did. The temptation to follow this
course is strong, at least in part because restrictive conceptions of commu-
nity and community identity seem inseparable from sheer ethnocentrism,
prejudice, and a fearful meanspiritedness. But it would be itself sympto-
matic of societal decline for us to imagine that such intolerable motivations
render illegitimate any community concern for its identity179 that extends
beyond merely seeking to prevent a range of bad consequences.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to shed some light on what should be thought
of as important paradoxes. Societies sometimes go into decline without be-
ing somehow forced to do so. Since decline would seem generally undesir-
able from that society's overall standpoint, why don't the forces of societal
renewal and regeneration prove effective? In particular, why doesn't the ju-
dicial system, whether it is autonomous or dependent on other social institu-
tions, play an important role in successfully resisting the decline of long-
established community values and standards, especially where the courts,
however much or little independent social influence they may possess,180 are
sworn to defend particular values and standards embodied in a constitution
at some previous time? The suggestions and illustrations discussed above
may serve to help explain these important paradoxes.
177. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 75 & 154.
179. For a sense of how political communities can define themselves differently in important,
legitimate ways, see generally the classic G. ALMOND & S. VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE (1965).
180. On the issue of the range and importance of authority that the courts can constructively
exert, independent from or in opposition to other, arguably more fundamental social institutions, it
is worth recalling Learned Hand's famous dictum that "[a] society so riven that the spirit of modera-
tion is gone, no court can save ... " L. HAND, THE SPiRrr OF LIBERTY 164 (I. Dillard ed. 1960).

